

COMPARISON OF DCI "OBJECTIVES";
NIC "VIEW OF THE FUTURE (IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE);
AND ICS - 1985 CAPABILITIES STUDY - A REVIEW "STRATEGIC CHALLENGES"

<u>DCI STRATEGY "OBJECTIVES"</u>	<u>VIEW OF THE FUTURE "IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE"</u>	<u>1985 ICS "STRATEGIC CHALLENGES"</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To engage and motivate the highest quality people available for intelligence careers - To meet consumer needs for intelligence on continuing problems and new issues - To forecast accurately and as early as possible Soviet weapons developments and deployments, as well as support arms control negotiations and monitoring - To extend and diversify intelligence support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There will be even greater need for dispassionate and forceful intelligence estimates and analysis - Greater attention must be paid to the impact or end-use of intelligence... on the need for much more effective use of intelligence by consumers - Far better biographic intelligence will be needed - Monitoring some Soviet nuclear weapons developments will be much more difficult - The greatest US intelligence priorities will continue to have to be given to Soviet military capabilities and intentions to destroy or gravely damage the US 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Manpower talent and productivity - The political, military, and economic policies and intentions of Soviet leadership - Design of Soviet strategic and general purpose weapons - Soviet warfighting doctrine, strategy, and plans - Intelligence on traditional allies - Economic intelligence - Surge capability - Arms control treaty monitoring and verification - Indications and Warning - Intelligence support to General Nuclear War - Comprehensive, worldwide intelligence foundation; data base and analytical ability

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<ul style="list-style-type: none">- To maintain our comprehensive collection capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- The Soviet threat will require considerable imaginativeness and investment in exotic intelligence collection systems- To deal with the Third World's growing chaos, far better on-site intelligence collection and evaluation by embassies and CIA stations will be necessary	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- To meet the challenges posed by the explosion of collected data		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- To maintain covert action capabilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Terrorism, espionage, and international illegalities
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- To strengthen the security and integrity of intelligence activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Care will be needed in fostering closer intelligence relations with allies governments, yet deal effectively with problems of Soviet intelligence penetrations of those governments.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- To enhance communications capabilities		<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Intelligence communications
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- To conceive an affordable program for ensuring the availability of needed intelligence through all states of hostility		